The groundwork has been and is being laid for the T word to be applied. The previous president fetes this anti-American TERRORIST at the Peopls’s House and then gives him $150 BILLION in cash to, ultimately, kill American with. The current President kills the bastard. Think about it while thinking about Ben Ghazi vs the most recent attack on our embassy in Tehran which, to give some idea of how corrupt the media is, our msm is trying to say this is Trumps’s Ben Ghazi except for the fact that Trump acted immediately, there were no American lives lost, there was no phony video story, there was no LYING to the American people and now there are dead LEADERS of terror.
But let’s see, based on this report by the US gov’t —
The U.S. State Department holds Soleimani responsible for the deaths of 608 U.S. personnel killed during the Iraq War (2003-2011), which is 17 percent of Americans killed during the lengthy war. Soleimani was the “head of the Iranian and Iranian-backed forces carrying out those operations killing American troops,” Fox News details. “According to the State Department, 17 percent of all deaths of U.S. personnel in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 were orchestrated by Soleimani.”
We have a man responsible for killing at least 608 Americans and the previous occupant of the White House not only had him at the White House he paid him $150 BILLION so he could make nuclear weapons and kill more Americans.
The negotiations were about something else entirely—they were about what Obama has described as a new geopolitical equilibrium, which would stabilize the Middle East and allow the administration to further minimize its role in the region. The way Obama described it publicly, this new security architecture was going to balance Iran against traditional American allies, like Saudi Arabia. However, it soon became apparent that the White House wasn’t really balancing at all, but had rather chosen one team over the others, Iran. Obama made his preference for Iran and its allies clear—in Lebanon, Syria, and most obviously in Iraq where the White House ordered air strikes on ISIS positions that allowed various Iranian-backed outfits, under the leadership of Qassem Suleimani, to take Tikrit.
Obama likes Suleimani, and admires his work. As the president reportedly told a group of Arab officials in May, the Arabs “need to learn from Iran’s example.”
In fact, they need to take a page out of the playbook of the Qods Force — by which [Obama] meant developing their own local proxies capable of going toe-to-toe with Iran’s agents and defeating them. The president seemed to marvel at the fact that from Hezbollah to the Houthis to the Iraqi militias, Iran has such a deep bench of effective proxies willing to advance its interests. Where, he asked, are their equivalent on the Sunni side? Why, he wanted to know in particular, have the Saudis and their partners not been able to cultivate enough Yemenis to carry the burden of the fight against the Houthis? The Arabs, Obama suggested, badly need to develop a toolbox that goes beyond the brute force of direct intervention. Instead, they need to, be subtler, sneakier, more effective — well, just more like Iran.
And it’s largely because the Arabs haven’t assembled their own version of IRGC-QF, and instead rely primarily on the United States for their security, that Obama thinks the Iranians are a much better bet. From Obama’s perspective, the Sunnis aren’t going to stop ISIS—in fact, they helped create it. However, the Iranians can do it, and plenty of other things as well. They can make sure Iraq stays stable—or the administration hopes Iran will play that role because it has no other options. Same, the White House thinks, with Syria, where Iran can manage the inevitable transition, after Assad steps aside, thanks to the Iranians, or is killed. The way Obama sees it, the Quds Force can be the administration’s boots on the ground.
So-called Iranian moderates like Javad Zarif may have negotiated the deal, but the real agreement is not with the regime’s so-called moderates. In fact, Obama doesn’t really care if the JCPOA forces a sort of Persian perestroika and brings moderates to the fore. Sure, “ideally, we would see a situation in which Iran, seeing sanctions reduced, would start focusing on its economy, on training its people, on reentering the world community, to lessening its provocative activities in the region,” as Obama told NPR in the spring. “But if it doesn’t change, we are so much better if we have this deal in place than if we don’t.”
The deal is with the hard men of the regime, the extremists—the deal is with Qassem Suleimani.
It’s not the moderates who control the nuclear file, but the IRGC. Accordingly, insofar as the United States and other world powers will have an interest in ensuring that the nuclear weapons program is not subject to turmoil should internal divisions in the regime turn dangerously nasty, the administration and other signatories to the deal now have a stake in ensuring the stability of the hardliners.
The White House is hardly shy about signaling the nature of its relationship with the regime, even if it’s lost on some regional actors. “If sanctions are lifted,” a Saudi diplomat said, “Iran will try even harder to redesign the region. Iran may see this as acceptance from America to play a bigger role.” The point of course is that Obama is counting on Iran to play bigger role in the Middle East, which is why the White House also agreed to drop the U.N. arms embargo.
The administration argues that Tehran will spend most of the money from sanctions relief on rescuing the economy, or fixing street lamps and potholes, and not so much on terrorism and other foreign adventures. But there can be no similar argument about buying and selling and smuggling arms since ending the embargo can only help the hardliners. Combining the two—tens of billions of dollars in immediate sanctions relief and an end to the embargo—is like loading a gun and handing it over to Qassem Suleimani. And that’s precisely what Obama intended: The way he sees it, he’s arming an American ally.